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Section I – Position of the Law of Obligations in Scotland.  
Hector L MacQueen 
A. Introduction  
Discussing the structure of the law is problematic for a non-codal system such as Scots law.  
The Scots law of contract is essentially non-statutory, that is, according to conventional 
understanding within the system, to be found in the decisions of the courts and so judge-
made.  The truth of the matter historically, however, is that the law of contract has been 
shaped most by the writings of jurists who themselves were usually borrowing their concepts 
and organisation of material from elsewhere – the European ius commune to begin with, later 
the English common law – even if they sometimes put upon that material their own “spin”, 
whether drawn from domestic sources of law or their own original reasoning.  It is very rare 
indeed to find a case in which a court invents new contract doctrine.  Normally the focus of 
the case is upon the dispute before it and the rules of law with which that dispute is to be 
resolved.  These rules are usually seen as already in existence, justified by reference to 
relevant authority within the system, and seldom needing to be considered against a wider 
background of the structure of the law of contract, let alone the law of obligations or, for that 
matter, the whole of private and commercial law.  Indeed, when a court is asked to develop 




 The only way in which a Scots lawyer might begin to think about issues of structure, 
or taxonomy, is when writing about or teaching the law.  There is a long-standing tradition in 
Scots private law of books that cover the whole of the law in a structured and systematic way, 
much of it reflecting another tradition in university law teaching, namely the coverage of 
private law in a long course entitled “Scots Law” or “The Law of Scotland”.2  This discussion 
of the position of the law of obligations in Scotland will be based upon a mainly historical 
analysis of these books, from which it will become apparent that there is indeed a strong, if 
not universal, Scottish perception of a law of obligations of which a general law of contract 
forms part, along with rules on particular contracts and on other forms of obligation, most 
notably the laws of delict and unjustified enrichment.
3
  
The most significant of the books are the so-called “Institutional writings” of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the massive tomes produced by James Dalrymple 
Viscount Stair in 1681 (2
nd
 edition 1693), Andrew McDouall Lord Bankton in 1751-53, and 
John Erskine (Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh University 1737-65) in 1773.  These 
works, entitled either Institutions or Institutes of the law of Scotland, were typically 
structured around the Roman law concepts of Persons, Things and Actions, although not 
uncritically so.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century George Joseph Bell, a successor of 
Erskine in the Edinburgh chair of Scots Law between 1822 and 1839, first published between 
1800 and 1804 what became known as his Commentaries on Mercantile Jurisprudence, 
                                                 
1
 Lloyds TSB Foundation v Lloyds Banking Group [2011] CSIH 87, 2012 SC 259; discussed further below, 
section II.B and C.  
2
 For a historical overview of Scottish legal literature in general see David M Walker, The Scottish Jurists, 1985. 
I have generally used the most recent editions of the works cited while cross-checking with earlier ones as 
appropriate.  See the bibliography appended to this article for details.  
3
 It may be said that the teaching tradition which produced this perception is today under threat because 
processes of “semesterisation” and “modularisation” in universities lead to balkanisation of private law studies.   
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which examined the law through the highly practical lens provided by debt enforcement 
procedures and bankruptcy.  Despite this departure from the institutional tradition, the book is 
usually classed amongst the Institutional writings as one of the formal sources of Scots law 
where statute and precedent are silent.  All the Institutional writings apart from Bankton 
enjoyed numerous editions well into the nineteenth century and exercised significant 
influence in the development of the law. 
 As university professors, Erskine and Bell each taught a Scots Law course; and each 
produced from this experience a book entitled Principles of the Law of Scotland: Erskine first 
in 1754, Bell in 1829.  These books were shorter and more concise than their major works 
mentioned above, but otherwise broadly followed an institutional structure.  Each book had a 
long life: the tenth and last edition of Bell’s Principles appeared in 1899, while the twenty-
first and last edition of Erskine’s Principles appeared as late as 1911.  The latter remained the 
leading teaching text, while Bell’s Principles became more of a practitioner’s vade mecum.  
Also influential were the lectures on Scots law delivered by David Hume, Professor of Scots 
Law at Edinburgh from 1786 to 1822, although they were not published in his lifetime, or 
indeed until the mid-twentieth century;
4
 but copies long circulated in manuscript and they 
helped to shape contemporary understanding of the law beside the published works of his 
fellow professors.   
Erskine’s Principles was eventually replaced as the leading student text by William 
Gloag and Robert Candlish Henderson’s Introduction to the Law of Scotland, first published 
in 1927 and now in its thirteenth edition, published in 2012.
5
  It was therefore not displaced 
by the Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland by T B Smith, published in 1962, or by 
David M Walker’s multi-volume Principles of Scottish Private Law (first published 1970), 
despite the latter running to four editions, the last of which appeared in 1988.
6
  It is also 
worth noting the tradition of multi-volume encyclopaedias of Scots law, which began in the 
late nineteenth century.  It is now represented by the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, of which 
T B Smith was the founding General Editor.  While the alphabetically ordered treatment of 
different legal topics does not lend itself to systematic analysis of the law’s taxonomy in 
general, Smith made strenuous efforts to minimise its impact on private law by arranging for 
the provision of two volume-length articles on Property and Obligations, the latter of which 
has a significant bearing upon the present contribution.   
B. General contract law in general law of obligations or in a special law  
In this section I will show that writers and teachers of Scots law have for the most part 
worked on the basis that there is a general law of obligations within which a general law of 
contract is to be placed for expository purposes. 
B.I Stair 
The beginning of the modern Scottish approach, and perhaps the only serious attempt at its 
philosophical justification, is to be found in Stair’s Institutions.  This is not the place for an 
                                                 
4
 Hume’s Lectures were edited by G C H Paton and published in six volumes by the Stair Society between 1939 
and 1958.   
5
 Gloag was Regius Professor of Law at Glasgow, while Henderson held the Edinburgh chair of Scots Law.  
6
 In 1962 Smith was Professor of Civil Law at Edinburgh, while in 1970 Walker held the Glasgow Regius chair.  
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elaborate treatment of the theory of law underpinning Stair’s extraordinary work.7  He was a 
Protestant natural lawyer who saw positive law as flowing from equity, albeit only 
imperfectly.  Law was a “rational discipline, having principles from whence its conclusions 
may be deduced”.8  The principles of equity, which were the efficient cause of rights and 
laws, were man’s obedience to God; the freedom of man otherwise; which, however, being in 
his power, man might constrain by voluntary engagement with others.  The three principles of 
positive law, which were the final causes or ends for which laws were made and rights 
established, were society, property and commerce.  The principle of obedience produced 
those positive law obligations not resulting from voluntary engagement, i.e. what we would 
now call the law of delict (tort) and the law of unjustified enrichment (restitution), as well as 
much of family law.  Freedom led to personal liberty of action outside these obediential 
obligations, and also to the right of what Stair called “dominion” over other things and 
creatures, i.e. property; while voluntary engagement produced the law of promises and 
contracts, which Stair termed “conventional obligations”.   
 “The formal and proper object of law,” Stair continued, “are the rights of men.”9  Stair 
built his work around this central idea of rights, beginning with the constitution and nature of 
rights; then their transfer from one person to another; and finally their enforcement.  He 
began his substantive discussion with a chapter on liberty, and then in his third chapter he 
analysed “Obligations in General”.  “Rights called personal or obligations,” wrote Stair, 
“being in nature and time for the most part anterior to, and inductive of, rights real of 
dominion and property, do therefore come under consideration next unto liberty.”10  Here he 
made what continues to be a fundamental distinction in Scots law between personal and real 
rights, or between obligations and property.  He followed Roman law in his general definition 
of an obligation: 
“Obligation is a legal tie by which we may be necessitate or constrained to pay, or 
perform something.  This tie lieth upon the debtor; and the power of making use of it 
in the creditor is the personal right itself, which is a power given by the law, to exact 
from persons that which they are due.”11 
In this chapter on obligations in general, however, Stair rejected the fourfold Roman 
distinction of obligations as ex contractu, quasi ex contractu, ex maleficio and quasi ex 
maleficio, in favour of the distinction he had already drawn between obediential and 
conventional obligations.  Stair went on to discuss the distinctions between natural and civil 
obligations, between principal and accessory obligations, and between pure and conditional 
obligations; but this is as far as he goes with the idea of obligations in general at this point.   
 Thereafter Stair treats particular heads of obligation, beginning with the obediential 
conjugal and parent-child obligations and the closely related obligations between tutors and 
                                                 
7
 A luminous recent analysis is MacCormick, Stair and the Natural Law Tradition: Still Relevant? in H L 
MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI, Stair Society, vol 54, 2009, 1ff. See also Reid, Thomas Aquinas and Viscount 
Stair: the Influence of Scholastic Moral Theology on Stair’s Account of Restitution and Recompense, Journal of 
Legal History 2008, 189ff.  
8
 Stair, Institutions, I,1,17.  
9
 Stair, Institutions, I,1,22.  
10
 Stair, Institutions, I,3,1.  
11
 Stair, Institutions, I,3,1. It should be noted (as Stair does) that there is a very old tradition in Scotland where 
an obligation is seen as a unilateral undertaking, usually written.  This sense survived until at least the mid-
nineteenth century.  
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curators, on the one hand, and pupil and minor children, on the other.  Then he deals with 
unjustified enrichment (restitution and recompense, including negotiorum gestio) and delict 
(reparation).  All of these are clearly labelled as obediential in nature.  Finally Stair arrives at 
a chapter entitled “Obligations Conventional, by Promise, Paction, and Contract”, which is 
followed with six chapters on the particular contracts of loan, mandate, custody, sale, location 
and society (partnership).  Stair next turns to “accessory obligations”, in a chapter which is 
essentially about personal securities (or caution, as it is usually termed in Scots law
12
).  Stair 
concludes his treatment of obligations with a chapter entitled “Liberation from Obligations”, 
in which he describes how conventional obligations cease by contrary consent, discharge, 
renunciation, pacts de non petendo, payment or performance, consignation, acceptilation, 
compensation (i.e. set-off), retention, innovation and confusion.
13
  Stair thus follows his 
declared method of considering the various ways in which personal rights come into 
existence, including contract both in general and in its particular forms, before finishing with 
the more general question of how obligations come to an end.  In all this, contract is clearly 
seen as part of the law of obligations, albeit as distinctive and multifaceted, and as separate 
from the law of property.  Stair also touches upon the interaction of obligations: “Contract 
may intervene where there intercedes a natural and obediential obligation ... yet where 
obediential and conventional obligations are concurring, they are both obligatory”.14 
B.II Erskine 
Bankton, the next major institutional writer, largely followed Stair’s approach and order of 
treatment, and will not be further discussed.  Erskine, however, adopted a more traditionally 
Romanist structure in his account of the law of obligations, albeit one in which contract was 
highlighted as the chief exemplar of an obligation.
15
  Yet in substance he too largely followed 
Stair, picking up the vital distinction between real and personal rights,
16
 and giving an 
account of obligations in general covering the same ground as Stair.
17
  Erskine also used the 
distinction between obediential and conventional obligations, treating under the former head 
the law of unjustified enrichment (restitution and recompense) and the law of delict 
(delinquency).
18
  The treatment is not however extensive.  Then Erskine moved to obligations 
by contract, on which however he has only a general paragraph dealing with incapacity and 
invalidity by reason of error, fraud, and force and fear.
19
  He then moves on and, within a 
couple of paragraphs, describes the following particular contracts (loan, deposit, trust, and 
pledge).  That these are the real contracts of Scots law in his view becomes apparent from his 
subsequent chapters which are more explicitly Roman in their structure: the first deals with 
“Obligations by word and by writing”,20  and the next with “Obligations arising from consent, 
and of accessory obligations”. 21   The obligations by consent include sale, permutation, 
location, freighting of a ship, insurance, society or copartnery, and mandate.  Into this chapter 
Erskine also inserts discussions of the quasi contracts, i.e. negotiorum gestio, indebiti solutio, 
liability under the Lex Rhodia, and the right of division in relation to common property.  The 
                                                 
12
 Stair also uses the term “surety”: Stair, Institutions, I,17,3-4.  
13
 Stair, Institutions, I,18.  
14
 Stair, Institutions, I,10,13. 
15
 Erskine, Institute, III,1-4.  See also the similar approach in Erskine, Principles, III,1-4.   
16
 Erskine, Institute, III,1,2. 
17
 Erskine, Institute, III,1,3-7. 
18
 Erskine, Institute, III,1,8-15. 
19
 Erskine, Institute, III,1,16. 
20
 Erskine, Institute, III,2.  The chapter includes a long discussion of bills of exchange (ibid, III,2,25-38).   
21
 Erskine, Institute, III,3.  
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chapter continues with a discussion of accessory obligations, the major example of which is, 
as with Stair, the contract of caution but which also includes the obligation to pay interest.  
Erskine then turns to what he calls the “general properties of obligations”,22 which includes 
the question of impossibility, conditionality, implement and damages, and interpretation.  
Erskine’s final chapter is “Of the dissolution of obligations”, in which he goes through the 
grounds of extinction also set out by Stair.
23
  Overall, then, Erskine’s approach is through the 
idea of a unified law of obligations, with contract in its different forms the most important 
instance of an obligation. But it cannot be said that his analysis has the power and intellectual 
coherence of Stair’s vision, or that he has a very well developed sense of a general law of 
contract.  Erskine can be characterised as a Romanist positivist rather than as a philosophical 
natural lawyer.  
B.III Hume and Bell 
The next significant treatments – or perhaps non-treatments - of the law of obligations were 
by Erskine’s successors in the Edinburgh chair of Scots law, David Hume (1786-1822), and 
George Joseph Bell (1822-38).  Under them the idea of a general law of obligations almost 
entirely disappears; even the idea of a general law of contract, only faintly apparent in 
Erskine, as we have seen above, was abandoned by Hume, although partially reinstated by 
Bell.  It is also noteworthy that Bell’s fairly brief discussion of the general law of contract, 
first published in 1829, remained the sole published account of the topic for almost the next 
100 years.   
 Despite being the nephew of the great philosopher of the same name, Hume professed 
to be sceptical of the value of philosophical generalisations about the nature and substance of 
law, at least for the beginning student of the subject.  But he also challenged the utility of 
Roman law structures for his own times,
24
  criticising in positivist vein Stair and Erskine’s 
Romanist definition of “obligation” as a legal tie by which one is bound to pay or perform 
something to another: 
“[Obligation] may with more propriety be defined “that state of relation in which one 
person stands to another whereby law compels him to do something for the benefit of 
that other.”  …  The criterion of a legal obligation then is that it may be performed 
and gives action.”25 
Aspects of Erskine’s structuring of the law were also criticised: 
“Erskine, after the Roman Law, has divided contracts into either written or verbal, but 
there seems no room for this mode of classing them, as the same contract when 
applied to one subject may be perfectly good though verbal, whereas when applied to 
another it is perfectly ineffectual unless attended with all the legal solemnities.”26  
Hume argued that the objects of the law were not the Roman Persons, Things and Actions but 
rather, more simply, Rights and Actions (“the means of prosecuting and enforcing Rights in 
                                                 
22
 Erskine, Institute, III,3,83.  
23
 Erskine, Institute, III,4.  
24
 Hume, Lectures, vol 1, 2-8. See also ibid, 357 (from lecture notes taken in session 1796-7).  
25
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 276.  
26
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 278.  
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the course of law”).27  Although he recognised and utilised the concepts of real and personal 
rights, he did not dwell much upon the differences between them, beyond saying that real 
rights were about the relationships between a person and a thing while personal rights, or 
obligations, sprang from a person forming connections with other individuals.
28
   
 Hume said even less than this about the sources of such personal rights.  In earlier 
versions of his lectures Hume mentioned in passing and without direct comment Stair’s 
distinction between obediential (called by Hume “natural”) and conventional obligations.29  
But later he simply said that personal rights arose from contract, delict, quasi-contract and 
quasi-delict – here, perhaps, surprisingly Romanist.30  Hume offered no general account of 
contract law, commenting only that, of these sources of obligation, “contract is by far the 
most ample and important”.31  He then continued: “And here I will first direct your attention 
to the contract of sale, the most frequent and most necessary of them all.”32  There follows a 
lengthy treatment of sale, which in turn is followed by similarly long discussions of other 
particular contracts: location, charter party, loan, mandate, society, cautionary, and bills of 
exchange.
33
  Up until about 1810 he also lectured on insurance.
34
  There is no attempt in any 
of this to identify general principles or rules, and Roman categorisations beyond the labels 
attached to each of the particular contracts are ignored.  Hume’s discussion of particular 
contracts is followed by a chapter on assignation of personal claims and four chapters on 
extinction of obligation by payment, compensation and retention, novation, and 
prescription.
35
  The focus of these chapters is clearly on the contractual context.  Only after 
they are complete does Hume turn to obligations ex delicto, obligations quasi ex contractu, 
and obligations quasi ex delicto.
36
 
 Hume at least said of Stair that he did “propose what upon the whole is a just enough 
order of arrangement”,37 and in some respects at least his own ordering of the law of personal 
rights was close to that of Stair.
38
  In no sense could this be said of Hume’s successor Bell.  
His treatment of substantive law in the Commentaries on Mercantile Jurisprudence began 
with the law of property before moving on to “Creditors by personal obligation or contract”.  
The focus is on contract or unilateral voluntary obligations, with nothing on delict, unjustified 
enrichment or negotiorum gestio.  Bell thus felt no need to discuss obligations in general.  
                                                 
27
 Hume, Lectures, vol 1, 9-10.  
28
 Hume, Lectures, vol 1, 10-11; ibid, vol 2, 1-3. 
29
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 277.  
30
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 3.  
31
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 3.  
32
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 3.  
33
 Hume, Lectures, vol 2, 3-55 (sale), 56-108 (location), 109-24 (charter party), 125-42 (loan), 143-70 
(mandate), 171-96 (society), 197-227 (cautionary), 228-75 (bills).  
34
 Hume, Lectures, vol 3, Appendix A (310-402).  The context is almost entirely maritime, and the chapter also 
discusses charter parties, salvage and general average.  
35
 Hume, Lectures, vol 3, 1-15 (assignation), 16-27 (extinction by payment), 28-59 (compensation and 
retention), 60-2 (novation), 63-119 (prescription; see also Appendix C at 420).  
36
 Hume, Lectures, vol 3, 120-164 (delict), 165-85 (quasi contract: see also Appendix B at 403-19), 186-98 
(quasi-delict). ). Negotiorum gestio and general average are treated under the head of quasi contract: see ibid, 
176-81. 
37
 Hume, Lectures, vol 1, 8.  
38
 So, like Stair, Hume treats the obligations between husband and wife, parent and child, and guardian (tutor 
and curator) and ward, as the first set of topics within the law of obligations: Lectures, vol 1, 19-319.  Next for 
Hume comes master and servant (ibid, 321-54), which for Stair was one of the contracts of location (Stair, 
Institutions, I,3,15; I,15).  Hume however treats reparation, restitution and recompense after contracts.  
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The treatment of general contract law was also relatively brief compared to the mass of 
material on particular contracts.
39
  Caution became simply a unilateral obligation rather than 
the main example of an accessory one; bills of exchange were also instances of unilateral 
obligations.
40
  Sale, hire, carriage, agency and factory were dealt with under the heading 
“Mutual contracts”, and there were also chapters on maritime contracts and on insurance.41  
Proprietary securities were dealt with only insofar as they affect heritable estates, that is, 
land.
42
     
 If it is clear that in the Commentaries Bell abandoned the taxonomic basics of the 
previous century of Scots law, this could be explained by the distinct aims of his book, which 
was not to provide an account of the whole of private law, but to consider those aspects of it 
most relevant to bankruptcy.  It is also clear, however, that in lecturing his Edinburgh 
students Bell likewise moved some way away from a general concept of an obligation.  The 
first sentence of his Principles says: “The object of jurisprudence is the protection and 
enforcement of Civil Rights”, and there follows a very brief definition of real and personal 
rights.  In his earliest editions Bell underlined his departure from Stair’s thinking: 
“It signifies little in what order rights relative to things shall be considered, - whether 
Personal rights relative to things, or Real rights, be first taken: But some 
conveniencies in explanation seem to recommend an arrangement by which the 
Rights arising from Contract or Convention shall first be considered.”43 
The substantive discussion begins immediately thereafter with general contract law.  There is 
no real attempt to explain the general idea of an obligation other than the old notion that an 
obligation was unilateral while a contract was mutual.
44
  The particular contracts are all dealt 
with before at last we reach a few pages on “Obligations independent of convention”, which 
are sub-headed “Restitution”, “Recompense” and “Reparation”.  Bell offers no explanation of 
why these topics are being treated as obligations save that each involves “invasions of right”.    
This part having been completed, Bell moves on to “Extinction of obligations”, covering all 
the usual ground in some detail.   
 Although this paper in general eschews speculation as to the sources of influence 
upon Scottish writers in their analysis of the law of obligations, it is worth noting the 
admiration which Bell had for the work of Pothier, in particular his Traité des Obligations.  
French-speaking from childhood, Bell had no need to rely on the English translation of 
Pothier’s treatise by W D Evans published in Britain in 1806.  Bell’s Principles and 
Commentaries cite Pothier’s treatise on obligations frequently, as well as his as yet 
untranslated work on the other particular contracts such as sale, hire, partnership, deposit and 
charter party.
45
  For Pothier too contract was the dominant form of obligation; his obligations 
treatise touches on other sources of obligation, by quasi-contracts, by injuries and negligence 
and by law, for only four of the 619 pages of the Evans translation.   
                                                 
39
 Bell, Commentaries, vol 1, 312-51.  
40
 Bell, Commentaries, vol 1, 351-454. 
41
 Bell, Commentaries, vol 1, 454-677. 
42
 Bell, Commentaries, vol 1, 712-95.  
43
 This statement appears in the introduction to the first, second and third editions of Bell’s Principles, but not 
the fourth (1836), the last to be published in Bell’s lifetime.   
44
 See note 11 above.  
45
 See Reid, From Text-Book to Book of Authority: The Principles of George Joseph Bell, Edinburgh Law 
Review (Edin LR) 2011, 6 ff, at 24-6.  
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B.IV The nineteenth century: a fallow period 
The later nineteenth century saw the rise in Scotland, as in England, of the textbook on 
particular topics of law.  There was very little, however, to sustain the idea of a law of 
obligations as distinct from a law of contract or a law of reparation or a law of particular 
contracts such as sale or partnership.
46
  In 1847 Bell’s son-in-law Patrick Shaw published A 
Treatise on the Law of Obligations and Contracts, saying in the preface that his aim was to 
systematise “the doctrines of Law in relation to Obligations and Contracts, which are 
scattered through [Bell’s] works”.  In reality however this is a book on contract law (where 
obligations are generally mutual between the parties) and unilateral voluntary obligations.
47
  
There is a treatment of a single chapter’s length of restitution, repetition, recompense, 
negotiorum gestio and reparation; but the chapter is headed “Implied obligations”, hinting 
that even these rested in some obscure way on the consent of the parties.  Shaw’s derivative 
work apart, the general notions of obligation and contract were expounded in the nineteenth 
century only in the successive editions of the great institutional works of Stair, Erskine and 
Bell, and the Principles of the latter two writers as edited by others.   
At the very end of the century there appeared the first Encyclopaedia of Scots Law,  
which included a fairly short article under the title “Obligation”.48  Its structure and content 
owed much to Stair, Erskine and Bell, with continued deployment of the distinction between 
personal and real rights, the use in some form of Stair’s distinction between obediential and 
conventional obligations, and analysis of conditional obligations and of the extinction of 
obligations.  But very little was done to link this brief discussion to fuller analyses of the 
substantive law of contract, delict and unjustified enrichment elsewhere in the volumes of the 
Encyclopaedia.  The article did not reappear in the 1912 edition of the Encyclopaedia.  But in 
1930 the so-called “Dunedin Encyclopaedia” (named for its Consultative Editor, the judge 
Lord Dunedin) contained a slightly more detailed article on “Obligations” which again made 




B.V Twentieth-century revival 
The systematic presentation of obligations with contract law, both general and particular, 
having its place therein rather than dominating the whole field, came back to the fore with the 
twentieth-century renewal of the general work covering the whole of Scots law, aimed 
principally at law students but of course also of value to the practising profession.  Gloag & 
Henderson from its first edition in 1927 has had as its third chapter (following accounts of 
sources of law and the legal system) “General Law of Obligations”.  This distinguishes 
between obligations by consent and other obligations, making some brief reference to Stair’s 
concept of the obediential obligation and also explaining the difference between personal and 
real rights.  The chapter specifically covers a number of topics such as conditions and joint 
and several liability; but until the 11th edition in 2001 extinction of obligations received its 
                                                 
46
 See e.g. M P Brown, Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821); F W Clark, Treatise on the Law of Partnership and 
Joint-Stock Companies (1866). Brown purported to follow Pothier’s arrangement in his Treatise on Sale: 
Brown, Sale, preface, pp. vii-viii.  
47
 Shaw thus maintains the ancient understanding of “obligation” in Scots law: see note 11 above.   
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own, separate chapter, followed by one on prescription.  These came after several other 
chapters on the general law of contract and one on Quasi-Contract (which included 
negotiorum gestio).  The chapters on extinction and prescription of obligations were followed 
by a series on particular contracts – Lease, Sale, Rights in Security, Caution, Master and 
Servant (now employment), Agency, Hiring and Deposit, Partnership, Company, Bills, 
Insurance, Carriage by Land and by Sea.  Next were chapters on General Average and 
Salvage; Reparation; and Defamation.  Thus Professors Gloag and Henderson divided 
contractual from other obligations; but unjustified enrichment was included in contract, and 
extinction and prescription were seen as chiefly relevant to contract.
50
  Modern restructuring 
now places extinction in the chapter on the general law of obligations (although prescription 
retains its own chapter), while leases and rights in security are to be found in the Property 
section of the book.  There has also been re-ordering of the other chapters on particular 
contracts and on unjustified enrichment.
51
 
 More coherent approaches emerged with the appearance of T B Smith’s Short 
Commentary and David M Walker’s Principles of Scottish Private Law.  Smith drew heavily 
on Stair in seeing the core of private law as based upon the rights of a person over the objects 
of law, which were real and personal rights, that is, property and obligations.  He highlighted 
the key distinction between contract and conveyance (the transfer of real rights).  “It does not 
follow that, because a contract could be reduced on grounds of fraud or (in some cases) 
because of error, real rights transferred in pursuance of such a contract are also vulnerable, if 
they have subsequently transferred to an onerous third party.”52  Smith’s detailed discussion 
of obligations began with questions of the subject’s internal classification.  He divided the 
subject into three: (1) Obligations ex lege (which included Quasi-Contract including 
negotiorum gestio, as well as Strict Liability without Personal Fault (Quasi-Delict); (2) Delict 
(Liability for fault or Culpa); and (3) Voluntary Obligations (essentially contract and 
unilateral promise).  Smith also touched on conditions as an aspect of general obligations law, 
but only lightly. 
 Smith became the first jurist to discuss concurrent and cumulative liability in the 
Scots law of obligations: “In general, it may be said, where an obediential duty is owed by A 
in delict, this duty remains due to B though A has entered into  a contractual relationship with 
B – unless the terms of the contract restrict the delictual duty.”53  The rationale for the 
position was explained in a way that Stair would have recognised: 
“It may be stressed that the categories of liability ex lege or those based on fault such 
as reparation or delict, restrict a person’s freedom irrespective of his will, and 
therefore logically take priority in the hierarchy of obligations.  Though contract may, 
as between the parties, modify the duties which the law would otherwise impose, 
unless they are so modified, they are not superseded merely because parties have 
entered into a contractual relationship.  A person suffering damage as a result of culpa 
or fault may elect to base his action on reparation rather than contract.”54   
                                                 
50
 It is worth noting that W M Gloag, The Law of Contract (first published in 1914 and then in a further edition 
in 1929), also treated quasi-contract (including negotiorum gestio) in some detail, although not delict: see its 
chapter XVIII. 
51
 For which see further below, section I.D.  
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Smith did not however consider the relationship between contract and unjustified enrichment, 
the latter of which seems not to have interested him very much.  Extinction of obligation, 
including prescription, was considered only in the context of contract, and that quite briefly. 
 Walker’s Principles is highly structured in form, with separate volumes devoted to 
Obligations and Property respectively.
55
  The Obligations volume has a brief general 
introduction drawing on Stair’s distinction between obediential and voluntary obligations, 
before turning to an elaborate treatment of the latter category (which includes promises as 
well as contract).  The discussion of the general principles of contract leads on to a series of 
chapters on particular contracts (curiously, not including sale).  Walker then moves on to 
obediential obligations, within which are treated the obligations of restitution, recompense, 
negotiorum gestio, general average and salvage as well as obligations of reparation arising 
from delict generally.  Then particular delicts are considered, and finally there are chapters on 
obligations arising from, respectively, statute and court decrees.  But there is little or no 
consideration of the interaction of the different heads of obligations 
 The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia made an ambitious if not completely successful 
attempt to develop further an approach founded on the idea of a general law of obligations in 
its volume 15 (published in 1996).  This contains a lengthy article “Obligations”, the structure 
of which is based on that found in T B Smith’s Short Commentary.  The article too is sub-
divided into an introductory part followed by major sections on “Obligations arising by force 
of law” (which includes unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and strict liability delicts), 
“Obligations arising from a wrongful act” (delict involving a party’s fault) and “Voluntary 
obligations”.  It concludes with a section on “Substitutionary redress” (i.e. damages).  The 
introductory part is brief, explaining the major divisions in what follows, and then 
commenting on conditions, the parties to an obligation, the object of obligations and, finally, 
concurrent and cumulative liability.  Extinction of obligations is treated independently in 
each of “Obligations arising from a wrongful act” and “Voluntary obligations”.  As the joint 
but independent work of several hands, the article lacks overall coherence, and is essentially a 
compilation of treatments of the various components of the law of obligations rather than a 
unified whole (unlike, say, the much more successful volume 18 on Property).  A reissue of 
the Obligations volume is in development, however, and the aim is for a much more coherent 
treatment, with a detailed general analysis of the law of obligations as the introduction, and 
the different sources of obligation being treated thereafter in a fashion taking full account of 
their possible interaction and links to the general principles previously set out.   
 The general analysis in the reissued Stair Encyclopaedia volume will be by Dr Martin 
Hogg, who has already published what is the most significant contribution to the 
understanding of the Scots law of obligations since at least the work of T B Smith, and 
perhaps since the publication of Stair’s Institutions.  The book, entitled simply Obligations, 
was first published in 2003, and reached a second edition in 2006.  Hogg devotes an initial 
chapter to the question, what is an obligation?  The remainder of the book is concerned with 
the interactions between the different sources of obligation, i.e. concurrent and cumulative 
liability.  It is by far the most sophisticated treatment yet to appear of that aspect of the law of 
obligations.  
 It should be briefly noted that it is not uncommon for the word “obligation” to be used 
in modern Scots law as a synonym or equivalent for the word “duty”.  It seems to be used in 
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this way in, for example, the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.  But section 
15(2) of that Act carefully provides:  
“In this … Act, unless the context otherwise requires, any reference to an obligation 
or to a right includes a reference to the right or, as the case may be, to the obligation 
(if any), correlative thereto.” 
C. General contract law integrated in the law of obligations or (partly) in a separate previous 
chapter  
As the foregoing discussion should have made clear, for those writers such as Stair, Erskine, 
T B Smith, David Walker and Martin Hogg, general contract law is an integrated part of the 
law of obligations.  Gloag & Henderson has also maintained this approach through thirteen 
editions under various editorial hands from 1927 to 2012.  With its single volume on 
Obligations within which the general law of contract is surveyed along with the law of delict 
and enrichment, the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia ensures that this approach remains the 
dominant one in the exposition of the modern law as a systematic whole, the one that would 
be followed should (per impossibile) Scots private law ever be codified.  
 For George Joseph Bell and his follower Patrick Shaw, however, contract was the 
principal form of obligation, and the general law on matters such as conditions and extinction 
of obligation was best approached through the medium of contract law.  Other sources of 
obligation such as quasi-contract and delict could be given separate but fairly brief 
consideration apart from contract.  In this, as already noted, they may have been influenced 
by Pothier’s treatise on the law of obligations.  The approach has also informed the writers of 
the major modern books on the law of contract, such as Gloag, Walker and W W McBryde.
56
  
Student texts on contract do discuss in a little more detail in their opening chapters the place 
of their subject within the broader fields of obligations and, indeed, private law;
57
 but 
otherwise contract law is treated by and large as a self-supporting structure.     
D.  General and special law of obligations/contract law (Where are the following areas being 
dealt with: principle of negotiorum gestio, unjust enrichment, tort law, securities law)  
The discussion in section I.A also shows that the law of delict and unjustified enrichment 
have always been seen as part of the law of obligations in Scotland, although quite frequently 
as a relatively minor part compared with contract.  The characterisation of enrichment 
obligations as quasi-contracts was, with the notable exception of Stair, standard until late in 
the twentieth century, when it was first successfully challenged in articles by the late Peter 
Birks.
58
  The tenth edition of Gloag & Henderson, published in 1995, changed the title of the 
chapter on Quasi-Contract to “Unjustified Enrichment”, and moved it from within the 
chapters on general contract law, to a place after the chapters on particular contracts and 
immediately before the chapters on the law of delict; in other words, moving it from amongst 
the conventional and voluntary obligations to the obediential ones.  The following year the 
Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia placed what it called “Unjust Enrichment” first amongst the 
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“Obligations imposed by law”,59 far away from the “Voluntary Obligations” section in which 
contract played the major part.
60
 
 Negotiorum gestio was always located amongst the quasi-contracts by Scottish writers 
until almost the end of the twentieth century.  Even for Stair, it was a major example of the 
obediential obligation of recompense, for him one of the two categories of enrichment-based 
liability.  The elimination of the concept of quasi-contract has led to some uncertainty about 
where to place negotiorum gestio.  The Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia gave the subject 
separate treatment after, but not as part of, its account of unjust enrichment.
61
  Gloag & 
Henderson initially left negotiorum gestio as part of the relocated and otherwise substantially 
rewritten chapter on unjustified enrichment.  But in its eleventh edition in 2001, new chapters 
were created in which negotiorum gestio was dealt with independently after a chapter on 
general average and salvage.
62
  This was criticised as displaying an excess of purism, and in 
the two subsequent editions (2007 and 2012), negotiorum gestio has returned to the 
unjustified enrichment fold, while general average and salvage have been consigned to the 
chapter on carriage of goods by sea.  It must be said that this is more a matter of convenience 
than principle.  A possible way forward may be through the principle against “unjustified 
impoverishment” which Martin Hogg identifies as underpinning negotiorum gestio and some 
aspects of pre-contractual liability.
63
  This idea is also apparent in general average and 
salvage,
64
 and it may be that in future the experiment made in the eleventh edition of Gloag 
& Henderson will be renewed in different form.  A final point worthy of note in this context 
is that the thirteenth edition of Gloag & Henderson takes from the DCFR the name 
“Benevolent Intervention” instead of negotiorum gestio.  It is understood that this approach 
will also be followed in the forthcoming reissue of the Obligations title in the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia.  That name could extend further to cover general average and salvage; but 
not, it is thought, the pre-contractual expenditure cases which Dr Hogg sees as also covered 
by his principle against unjustified impoverishment. 
 Proprietary securities tend now to be dealt with in property law as an aspect of real 
rights, although pledge was treated as a real contract by Stair, Bankton and Erskine.  Hume 
and Bell began the process of removing proprietary securities from a contractual setting, and 
this was reinforced, if not completed, in the late nineteenth century by the appearance in 1897 
of the massive treatise Rights in Security by William Gloag and James Mercer Irvine.  Dr 
Andrew Steven comments of this work: 
“The law of real security sits upon the axis of the law of obligations and the law of 
property.  A balanced treatment is very difficult to maintain and it is probably correct 
to say that the authors consider the subject more from the obligations angle.  For 
example, with regard to pledge, lien and hypothec there is no discussion about the 
exact point at which the respective real rights come into existence.”65 
Consistently with this view of its predecessor the chapter entitled “Rights in Security” in the 
first edition of Gloag & Henderson appeared amongst the ones on the particular contracts, 
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and it was only in the eleventh edition of 2001 that this chapter was reconstituted and moved 
to the Property section of the book.  Modern books on contract still include discussion of the 
security right of lien as an aspect of the self-help remedies for breach of contract.
66
 
 Personal securities, in particular cautionary obligations, continue generally to be 
treated within the law of obligations when not actually treated altogether independently.  So 
in Gloag & Henderson the topic receives a chapter amongst the others on particular 
contracts.
67
  This chapter highlights the notion that the obligation is accessory to another or 
principal obligation; but accessoriness is no longer to be found explained as a concept within 
the law of obligations as a whole, important though it is also in the law of securities and 
assignation.
68
   
E. Systematic position of consumer contract law and commercial contract law (e.g. special 
regulations and – if existing – where regarding B2B-contracts, B2C-contracts, P2P-contracts)  
Commercial and consumer law today are principally areas of United Kingdom rather than 
either Scots or English law.  This is reflected in both being areas of law over which the 
legislative competence of the devolved Scottish Parliament is very largely excluded by the 
Scotland Act 1998.
69
  Many key areas are largely governed by the quasi-codifying UK 
statutes first passed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries – the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1880, the Partnership Act 1890, the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 as amended) and the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  The aim of these statutes was 
generally to produce a unified law in the United Kingdom’s single market; and that is also the 
justification for reserving them to the legislative competence of the United Kingdom 
Parliament.   
 The picture is however complicated by the distinctiveness of certain areas in Scotland 
where the common law continues to play a significant role.  The law of hire, or location to 
use the traditional terminology derived from Roman law, is one example, albeit narrowed 
considerably in its scope by extensive legislation in the fields of employment and leases of 
land.  Rights in security, debt enforcement and insolvency procedures are other topics in 
which the common law continues to be significant, albeit often supplemented by legislation 
which is sometimes of a basically UK character.  The fundamental differences between the 
Scots and English law of property, and the absence of a distinct equitable jurisdiction in the 
Scottish courts, make unity in these areas impossible to achieve short of the abolition of 
either Scots or English law altogether.  On the other hand, the common law of Scotland had 
relatively little to offer on such matters as companies, intellectual property and, when the 
time came, consumers; and in all these fields what we see now is United Kingdom 
legislation, with a significant amount of that actually resulting from the interventions of the 
European Union. 
 In considering the systematic position of commercial and consumer law, we must first 
note that neither legislators nor judges have concerned themselves with the issue of overall 
system.  The quasi-codifying statutes already referred to do not add up to a commercial code, 
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and were never intended to do so.  Each stands on its own, its inter-action with the rest of the 
law a matter for determination in particular cases where issues arise, and not otherwise.  Once 
again, therefore, the only place in which there is any prospect of systematic consideration of 
these fields is in textbooks and teaching.  In Scotland what was to begin with called 
Mercantile Law became a distinct subject in the university law curriculum in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, typically covering sale of goods, rights of security in 
moveables, bills of exchange, insurance, carriage, agency, partnership and companies.
70
  
These were also the topics covered in the first student textbook, A Popular Handbook of the 
Commercial Law of Scotland, by W D Esslemont, published first in 1911 and having three 
further editions, in 1915, 1929 and 1946.  Esslemont’s work seems to have co-existed with 
Allan McNeil and John Lillie’s Mercantile Law of Scotland, first published in 1923, the 
coverage of which was however similar.  This book, which went through five more editions 
up to 1965,
71
 was a relatively slight work intended only for students, simply treating each 
subject in its own right and making no attempt to systematise or explain what held them 
together.  Much more substantial was J J Gow’s Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, 
which came out in 1964 as a volume complementary to T B Smith’s Short Commentary of 
1962.  It covered all the ground in McNeil & Lillie, and added in a treatment of intellectual 
property and employment law.  But although Gow had a much stronger vision and grasp of 
unifying principles, both legal and commercial, his book had only one edition, and too 
frequently it becomes a compilation of the relevant law under each chapter heading rather 
than a systematic overview.  The topical rather than systematic approach has held good for 
more recent student texts on what is now generally known as commercial law.
72
  Scots law 
has not so far been able to match the remarkable Commercial Law produced by Sir Roy 
Goode south of the border.  
 Consumer contract law is generally treated within texts on contract or commercial 
law, often in dedicated chapters.  Only one book-length treatment of the subject exists, 
Cowan Ervine’s Consumer Law in Scotland, first published in 1995 and now in its fourth 
edition (2008).  His approach is to “deal with the protection afforded to private consumers of 
goods and services”,73 which has a strong contractual flavour; but the book is by no means 
confined to contractual questions, covering also delictual and criminal liability as well as 
regulatory issues.  Ervine excludes financial services.  A more systematic view of consumer 
law in its private law or obligations context may be possible after the passage of the so-called 
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“Consumer Bill of Rights” through the United Kingdom Parliament in the course of 2013-
2014.  The aim of this legislation will be to draw together all major consumer protection law 
in a single statute, and to make civil enforceability a much more visible element in consumer 
protection.  It remains to be seen how much can be achieved in this way.   
 Contracts between two or more private persons (P2P) have received no systematic 
attention in Scotland.  
F. Function and criteria for the creation of contract types (e.g. referring to objects such as 
sale, rent and/or to protective function such as distance selling)  
The classical accounts of the law took the categorisation of particular contracts from Roman 
law, even to the extent, in Erskine’s case, of grouping them as consensual, verbal, real and 
written.
74
  These groupings had largely disappeared by the end of the eighteenth century, but 
the labels of particular contracts – sale, location, custody and deposit, mandate, society - 
continued to be drawn from Roman law.  New categories such as insurance and bills of 
exchange could be readily accommodated as simply new kinds of contract, often closely 
linked with the maritime contracts which the writings of Hume and Bell in particular show to 
have become extremely important in Scotland around and in the decades after 1800.  Some of 
the unity of the old Roman categories began to fall apart after this time: most notably with the 
breakout of the law of master and servant from an essentially domestic to an industrial and 
commercial context, becoming known in the later twentieth century as employment or labour 
law; but also with the rise of different forms of leasing both land and goods (including the 
hybrid hire-purchase) and increasing amounts of protective regulation of one kind or another.  
But the legislation which effected this regulation continued to use the names and terms of the 
contracts it touched: e.g. Employment Protection Acts, Rent Acts, Hire Purchase Acts.
75
 
 Consumer protection legislation has tended to rely less on the labelling of contracts 
for its names, preferring instead to rely on contexts and/or aims: trade descriptions, consumer 
credit, unfair contract terms, to give some of the more obvious United Kingdom examples.
76
  
The consumer protection laws coming from the European Union have often been even more 
fact-specific as to their intended goal: time shares, package holidays, distance selling, 
contracts concluded off business premises, electronic commerce, unfair commercial practices, 
to give some of the more recent examples.
77
  This in part accounts for the difficulty of fitting 
these pieces of legislation in more general accounts, whether of consumer or of contract law.   
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G.  “Guiding-model” of a contract type for the whole contract law (e.g. sales law or 
employment contracts). In particular, which role have continuing obligations and cooperation 
or “network” contracts?  
T B Smith once described sale as “the master contract from which argument by analogy was 
frequently made”.78  Even his use of the past tense here is misleading so far as Scots law is 
concerned.  Although sale may provide the commonest examples used by writers and 
teachers in expounding contract law, it is difficult to see the subject historically as providing 
any sort of guiding model.  Sale is not even necessarily treated first amongst the particular 
contracts by the earliest institutional writers.  It is true that Hume, who gives no account of 
general contract law, begins with sale in his treatment of particular contracts;
79
 but there is no 
real sense in his exposition, or in later chapters, that this is a “guiding model” around or upon 
which either the general law or the law of other forms of contract is built.  Sale has gained 
some prominence since it was placed first amongst the particular contracts by Bell in his 
Principles, an approach followed also (from the second edition of 1933) in Gloag & 
Henderson.
80
  But in Walker’s Principles, as already noted, 81  there is no independent 
treatment of sale amongst the particular contracts.  Books on commercial law often, but not 
invariably, give sale of goods a position at or very nearly at the start of the book, hinting that 
this is the core of commerce and commercial transactions in general;
82
 but such a pattern of 
exposition is by no means invariable.
83
   
The issue of long-term and “network” contracts has received no systematic attention 
in Scotland.  
H. To what extent are the rules guided around the individual contract relationship and to what 
extent around guiding market behaviour (“prevention” etc.)? 
Stair’s emphasis on engagement as a way in which persons exercised their fundamental right 
of liberty meant that for him freedom and sanctity of contract were also fundamental.  “There 
is nothing more natural than to stand to the faith of our pactions,” he wrote.84  In a famous 
aphorism he also said that “every paction produceth action”,85 with “even pactum corvinum 
de haereditate viventis .. binding with us.”86  The major exception to the general rule of 
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enforceability was the pactum de quota litis.
87
 Stair also minimised the role of requirements 
of form to be found in Scots law.
88
  Only if a contract was impossible or illegal, or if a party 
was incapable, compelled by another, or made an error about the “substantials” of the 
agreement, might it be struck down.
89
  Fraud and extortion were wrongs which gave rise to 
the obediential obligation of reparation, which could be set off against the obligations arising 
under any resultant contract rather than striking it down.
90
  There was no doctrine of equality 
of exchange beyond what the parties agreed, although there might be abatement of price for 
the latent insufficiency of goods sold, and penalty or similar clauses “ought to be and are 
reduced to the just interest, whatever the parties’ agreement be”.91  Innominate contracts were 
enforceable, the “only profitable distinction” from nominate contracts being that “in all 
contracts, not only that which is expressed must be performed, but that which is necessarily 
consequent and implied; but in nominate contracts, law hath determined these 
implications.”92   
Erskine took a similar line: “By our law all contracts, even innominate, are equally 
obligatory on both parties from the date, so that neither party can resile.”93   Hume too 
rejected Romanist distinctions between nominate and innominate contracts: “These 
distinctions are all done away with us.”94  There was some emergence in the later eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries of an idea that freedom and sanctity of contract, being 
themselves based on public policy (rather than the free will which Stair had predicated), must 
yield to weightier concerns of the same public policy, for example in the preservation of an 
individual’s freedom to trade or practise a profession. 95   But this was balanced by an 
increasingly restrictive approach to fraud and error as grounds for escaping from a contract;
96
 
and in general Scots common law has shared its English counterpart’s aversion to playing a 
regulatory role over contractual freedom.
97
  It has usually needed legislation to achieve 
protection for employees, consumers and other potentially disadvantaged contracting parties. 
II. Topic: Supranational Law and National Legislation  
A. Orientation at international bodies of regulation (e.g. CISG, Unidroit, PECL)?  
The United Kingdom has not so far ratified the Vienna Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods 1980, which thus forms no part of the law in Scotland (or in England & Wales, or 
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Northern Ireland).  Proposals for ratification have always foundered on the steadfast 
opposition of City of London interests.  Over the years, there have been calls from other 
quarters in the United Kingdom for ratification of the CISG. As the Scottish Law 
Commission commented in its 1993 Report on Formation of Contracts:  
 
“The Scottish Law Commission, when consulted as part of the consultation exercises 
carried out by the Department of Trade in 1980 and by the Department of Trade and 
Industry in 1989, recommended that the United Kingdom should become a party to 
the Convention.  The English Law Commission has also given a favourable 
response.”98 
 
The Scottish Law Commission saw “obvious advantages for Scottish traders, lawyers and 
arbiters in having our internal law the same as the law which is now widely applied 
throughout the world in relation to contracts for the international sale of goods”.99  In the 
absence of ratification, the Commission therefore considered whether the more general rules 
on contract formation in the CISG could be adopted as part of the general law of Scotland on 
the formation of contracts.  The resultant recommendation, that this should be done, remains 
unimplemented despite generally favourable reactions from the Scottish legal community at 
the time.   
 
 There continues to be interest in Scotland in Article 93 CISG, which provides: 
 
“(1) If a Contracting State has two or more territorial units in which, according to its 
constitution, different systems of law are applicable in relation to the matters dealt 
with in this Convention, it may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, declare that this convention is to extend to all its territorial 
units or only to one or more of them.” 
The question of interpretation which may arise is whether, given that the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 is largely a UK measure, the relatively few distinctly Scottish provisions in the 
legislation, plus the differences in the common laws of contract which the 1979 Act allows to 
continue, would be enough to make Scotland a territorial unit within which there exists a sale 
of goods law different from that of the rest of the United Kingdom so that Article 93 could be 
applied.  
 The Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Lando Principles 
of European Contract Law (PECL) are referred to in textbooks, but have so far not been cited 
at all in the Scottish courts.
100
  Since the beginning of 2010, however, the Scottish Law 
Commission has been engaged in a review of contract law in the light of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference.  The Commission’s Eighth Programme of Law Reform states: 
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“We propose to review the law of contract in the light of the publication in 2009 of 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference: Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law (the DCFR).  The DCFR provides a contemporary statement of 
contract law, based on comparative research from across the European Union and 
written in accessible and non-archaic English.  The DCFR has a considerable amount 
to offer in the law reform process.  It may be seen as an instrument to provide an 
important area of Scots law with a systematic health check, giving a basis for 
treatment where the law is found to be ailing or otherwise in need of remedial 
treatment.  The DCFR is at least a good working platform for a series of discrete and 
relatively limited projects on contract law, akin in some ways to our work on trusts 
and having significance for the well-being of the Scottish economy.”101   
 The first phase of the Commission’s work in this project has been a return to four 
unimplemented Reports on contract law, published in the 1990s.  These dealt with the topics 
of formation, interpretation, remedies for breach of contract and penalty clauses.  In all of 
them reference was made to the Unidroit Principles and the PECL.  The Commission has so 
far published two Discussion Papers, on interpretation and formation,
102
 and work is now 
proceeding on remedies for breach of contract, including penalty clauses.  These Discussion 
Papers refer in detail, not only to the DCFR, but also to the Unidroit Principles and the PECL.  
The same method will be followed in the Discussion Paper on remedies for breach.  Reports 
on all the Discussion Papers may be anticipated by late 2014, which will perhaps reveal the 
extent to which the DCFR and its predecessors may have an influence on the future 
development of contract law in Scotland. 
 The Discussion Paper on formation of contract also referred in detail to the European 
Commission Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL),
103
 since its rules on 
formation constituted a refinement in some respects of those in the DCFR.  It is less likely 
that the CESL rules on breach will be used in the same manner, since they are more geared 
towards sale than to contract law in general.  The Scottish and English Law Commission have 
also published a critical analysis of the CESL proposal as an “Advice to the United Kingdom 
Government” on the subject, which appeared just a month after the Proposal itself.104  This 
argued that the most significant problem to be addressed from a single market perspective 
was that of on-line consumer contracting, and suggested that the proposal should be re-
worked to tackle the issue more directly.  The Advice was doubtful about the likely take-up 
in the business-to-business context; but it recommended that if the CESL were to come into 
force, the UK Government should make it available for domestic as well as cross-border 
transactions and should not insist in the B2B context that one of the parties must be a small or 
medium-sized enterprise (SME).  The United Kingdom Government came out against the 
CESL proposal on 13 November 2012.
105
  City of London interests are as resolutely opposed 
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to it as they have been to the CISG, but again the view emerging from Scotland has been 
more nuanced.
106
   
 The Scottish Law Commission has made use of the DCFR in projects on moveable 
security, trusts and positive prescription as well as contract law.  In its joint work with the 




 One side-effect of the Scottish Law Commission work with the DCFR and associated 
instruments is a gradually growing awareness of them in the Scottish legal profession.  This 
has been reflected in at least one case currently before the courts in Scotland, Lloyds TSB 
Foundation v Lloyds Banking Group.
108
  Space precludes any detailed treatment, but one 
important issue in the case is whether Scots contract law has any general rule on change of 
circumstances allowing the court to modify the terms of a contract.
109
  The answer so far has 
been a clear negative, but the case is now subject to an appeal to the UK Supreme Court due 
to be heard on 27 and 28 November 2012.  At the level below, the First Division of the Inner 
House of the Court of Session, counsel for the party in whose interest it would be to invoke a 
change of circumstances doctrine pointed the court to the proposal for such a rule in 
European contract law based upon its existence in other systems of contract law in the 
European Union.  The court invoked the work of the Scottish Law Commission in its 
comments: 
“We were referred to a Feasibility Study (dated 3 May 2011) by the Commission 
Expert Group on European Contract Law on a possible Future Instrument in European 
Contract Law. This includes an article (Article 92) on obligations and remedies of the 
parties to a sales contract which provides for a situation in which performance of an 
obligation under such a contract has become excessively onerous because of an 
exceptional change of circumstances. This proposal, which appears to relate only to 
contracts of sale, is not uncontroversial. The Scottish Law Commission has responded 
with the observation that it is "not convinced of the utility of Article 92". The 
Commission noted that, "there is no doctrine of equitable adjustment in Scots law to 
deal with change of circumstances, as distinct from the law of frustration". While it 
appears that certain European jurisdictions do have some form of equitable 
adjustment of contracts, there is, as yet, no foundation for it, as a generality, in Scots 
law. It would be beyond the proper scope of judicial power to develop it in any way 
which would assist the respondent in this case.”110 
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While then the appeal to European comparisons and developments was unsuccessful in this 
instance, it was not dismissed out of hand as inappropriate for consideration by a Scottish 
court.  Rather, the finding was that the particular development required for Scots law to 
recognise any doctrine of change of circumstances was for the legislature rather than the 
court.
111
   
B. Transfer of directives within the law code?  
European Union Directives are generally transposed into law in the United Kingdom by way 
of Regulations made under the European Communities Act 1972 (the legislation under which 
the Westminster Parliament authorised the United Kingdom’s membership of what was then 
the European Communities from 1 January 1973).  While this may involve amendment of 
existing primary legislation – for example, of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 as a result of the 
Consumer Sales Directive 1999, or of the Timeshare Act 1992
112
 as a result of the Timeshare 
Directive 1994 - the more usual form is for the Regulations to be “stand-alone”, and for the 
integration of the new rules with the old to be left to lawyers and courts to work out for 
themselves should any questions arise.  Thus for example the Package Travel, Package 
Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992 implement Council Directive (EEC) 90/314 
and the Cancellation of Contracts made in a Consumer’s Home or Place of Work etc 
Regulations 2008 and the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 as 
amended implement respectively Council Directive (EEC) 85/577 and Council Directive 
(EC) 97/7.  These Directives have in their turn now been replaced by European Parliament 
and Council Directive 2011/83/EU (the Consumer Rights Directive), and in due course 
therefore the Regulations will be replaced by new legislation, possibly embodied in the 
Consumer Bill of Rights promised for 2013.   
 The approach is to be explained by the concern which arose after the Francovich 
decision of the European Court of Justice in the mid-1990s,
113
 under which a Member State 
may be found liable in damages to an individual who has suffered loss or damage as a result 
of the Member State’s failure to transpose a sufficiently clear and unconditional Directive 
into domestic law.  This led in the United Kingdom to the practice of “copy out”; that is, the 
practice of simply transliterating the text of Directives into domestic legal form, resisting the 
“gold plating” of rewriting them so as to produce a harmonious match of domestic and 
European rules.   
The approach can lead to messiness.  The prime examples are the co-existence of two 
regimes on unfair contract terms: one being the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
other the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 implementing Council 
Directive (EC) 93/13.  But the amendment of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 as a result of the 
Consumer Sales Directive left the consumer buyer of faulty goods with two ways of 
terminating the contract of sale, either within a short period after the sale or following the 
failure of the seller to repair or replace the goods.  The messiness does not seem to have led 
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to serious issues in any reported litigation, but it is not clear how it may have affected the 
advice which lawyers have given to prospective clients, whether consumers or traders.
114
   
The absurdities thus produced are of course anathema to the souls of Law 
Commissioners, and the Scottish and English Commissions have jointly made efforts to 
remove the present anomalies in both consumer remedies and unfair terms law.
115
  It is hoped 
that the expected Consumer Bill of Rights will end at least these two difficulties more or less 
along the lines recommended by the Commissions.  But it is significant that in so far as these 




C. Frequent extended “voluntary” transfer in contract law?  
“Voluntary” transfer of concepts from other systems into the Scots law of obligations and 
contracts is not really a characteristic of the modern system.  This is well illustrated by the 
reluctance of the First Division of the Court of Session to contemplate a general doctrine of 
change of circumstances in Lloyds TSB Foundation v Lloyds Banking Group,
117
 even 
although such a doctrine existed in other legal systems in the European Union.  Also 
important, although not stated, was the fact that no such doctrine is recognised in the English 
law of contract.  Had the court been invited to recognise as part of Scots law a doctrine that 
already formed part of English law the outcome might have been different.  So in another 
recent case, the First Division accepted with little discussion that the English doctrine of 
“knowing receipt” formed part of the Scots law of fiduciary obligations of restitution.118  
Such uncritical borrowing from English law has long been familiar in Scots contract law.  
Examples are however comparatively few and date mostly from the nineteenth century: 
undue influence, misrepresentation, repudiation and anticipatory breach, and frustration are 
probably the main ones.  Native concepts originally of relatively broad scope have also been 
restricted because of their apparent difference from English law: examples include fraud, 
third party rights, and the limitation of specific implement as an entitlement of a contracting 
party.   
A paradoxical example of conceptual transfer is provided by the concept of good faith 
in contract law.  It is arguable that such a concept once informed the Scots law of obligations, 
perhaps more in the refusal to allow bad faith to succeed than in the imposition of obligations 
to behave in good faith, but deploying objective standards of behaviour nonetheless.
119
  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, even this concept had faded in the face of ideals of laissez 
faire, freedom and sanctity of contract.  But the European Union’s contract law Directives 
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brought the concept of good faith back into focus, notably but not exclusively in the Unfair 
Terms Directive.  In a Scottish House of Lords case in 1997 the court referred to “the broad 
principle in the field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith” when striking down a 
guarantee of the business debts to a bank of the guarantor’s spouse.120  The apparent breadth 
of this decision has since been severely restricted by the Scottish courts,
121
 and it has not been 
allowed to escape from the law of guarantees (cautionary obligations) into the rest of contract 
law.  But what is worth noting is that the original House of Lords decision was not inspired 
by the arrival of good faith from the Continent so much as by the need to find some way to 
bring Scots law into line with the position reached by the House for English law in a decision 
some three years before the Scottish one.
122
  The English decision had however been based 
on the equitable doctrine of constructive notice to which there was no readily available 
equivalent in Scots law – hence the reaching for the concept of good faith.  At the same time 
it should also be noted that the Scottish courts have resisted acceptance of the English courts’ 
elaboration of very specific rules on the steps to be followed by a bank in dealing with a 
potential guarantor who might be subjected to improper pressure from the debtor.
123
  In this, 
at least, the Scottish courts have adhered to a tradition of looking at the overall fairness of a 
relationship rather than trying to regulate it in detail.  
D. If 2. and/or 3. apply: Influence of this transfer on special areas and/or structure of the 
whole law code?  
Again, this question is not really meaningful in the context of a non-codal system.  As already 
noted, the messiness does not seem to have led to serious issues in any reported litigation.    
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